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BOOK REVIEWS
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIz INSURANCE CONTRACTS. By Charles Wendell
Carnahan. Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1942. Pp. xvii, 760. $12.00.
There have been important volumes in the past, dealing with the subject
of Conflict of Laws, by Professors Beale, Stumberg, and others, including
the recent revised case book by Professors Cheatham, Dowling, Goodrich,
and Griswold, as well as articles of great significance by Professor W. W.
Cook. However, notwithstanding the growth of the life insurance business
to gigantic proportions dominated by companies operating on a nationwide
basis, scant attention has heretofore been given to the subject of Conflict
of Laws as it pertains to life insurance, most text writers devoting merely
one or two pages to this important branch of the subject. The Restatement
of Conflict of Laws for example furnishes three sections-about one and
one-half pages--to life insurance matters. Professor Carnahan's book on
the Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance is the first and only volume, within
the knowledge of this reviewer, dealing exclusively with the applicability
of Conflict of Laws to life insurance questions. Segregation of this im-
portant portion of the field of conflicts in one book, '760 pages in length,
is a valuable contribution both to the subject of Conflict of Laws and espe-
cially to life insurance legal literature.
Since the development of Conflict of Laws as an independent title in the
classifications of general jurisprudence has taken place comparatively re-
cently, its principles as applied to the subject of contracts generally have
been ambiguous and troublesome, and its doctrines marked by indefiniteness.
Frequently the basis itself for the choice of one law rather than another
is obscure or difficult to determine. In addition to this, further complica-
tions arise by reason of the highly specialized character of life insurance
problems themselves and consequently slight basis for solution is provided
by way of analogy to general contract cases disposed of under principles
of Conflict of Laws.
Professor Carnahan, finding it difficult to lay down rules as to life
insurance, approached the problem by subdividing his book carefully so as
to subject very narrow issues, in the various cases involving life insurance
problems, to scrutiny in the light of basic principles of Conflict of Laws.
Accordingly, the first three chapters deal with certain general principles
which run throughout the entire book. The next seven chapters are con-
cerned with the manner in which the courts have applied these general
principles in the solution of Conflict of Laws questions affecting individual
;life insurance problems. The final chapter sets forth the author's con-
clusions.
Chapter one deals with various factors affecting life insurance problems
in the conflict of laws. A brief survey is made of the insurance back-
ground, showing the growth of the business, its economic importance, and
the development of interstate and international characteristics. Then the
author discusses the legal background, or the system of principles of con-
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Itict of laws which permits a variety of choices as to governing rules of
law. While the familiar basic rules in conflict of laws for the interpre-
tation of contracts-namely, the place of making, the place of performance,
and the intention of the parties-are elementary, and the place of making
an insurance contract generally being the place of delivery of the policy
to the applicant, the difficulty arises over interpretation of the term "de-
livery" which is frequently used in different senses. However, for most
purposes the overwhelming majority of conflict of laws cases which follow
the "place of making" rule hold that the last necessary act to make a
binding insurance contract occurred at the place of physical receipt of the
policy by the applicant.
Pre-eminently important in conflict of laws cases involving life insurance
contracts are the constitutional limitations of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the full faith and credit clause of Article IV
in its application to state statutes. Although historical research has shown
that it was within the contemplation of the Constitutional Convention that
Article IV, Section 1, not only included public acts but was also intended
to be self-executing, it was not until 1932 that the Supreme Court in Brad-
ford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper," squarely held that the full faith and
credit clause did extend to state statutes and that the clause was self-
executing. The full faith and credit clause is available only when the sister
state rule is based upon a statute, and it is therefore narrower than the
due process clause which appears available to review a state decision
whether the forum's rule is based upon common law or statute and whether
the sister state rule be common law or statutory. The first chapter of the
book reveals that problems of full faith to statutes and of the due process
clause have not yet been fully worked out by the Supreme Court. Professor
Carnahan has found eight important Supreme Court cases since 1932 from
which outlines of the scope of the full faith and credit clause, as applied
to state statutes, may be discerned. Four of these were concerned with
Workmen's Compensation Laws and one-John Hancock Mutual Life In-
surance Co. v. Yates2 involved a life insurance contract.
Although the full faith and credit clause has been applied to compel the
courts of the forum to adopt the rules of a sister state when the latter
have been embodied in statutes, it does not necessarily follow that the courts
of the forum must apply those rules. Familiar exceptions are those where
the foreign law was not pleaded or where the forum misconstrued the
statute.
In the Yates case the rules of the forum and of the sister state were
each partly statutory. In the Bradford case the rules of each state were
statutory and the forum was required to apply the sister-state rule. How-
ever, in other cases, such as Alaska Packers Ass'n . Industrial Accident
Comm.3 and Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm.4 the
1. (1982) 286 U. S. 145.
2. (1936)-299 U. S. 178.
3. (1935) 294 U. S. 532.
4. (1989) 306 U. S. 493.
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rules of each state were statutory and yet the forum was not compelled to
adopt the sister-state rule. The cases show that no mechanical test has
yet been laid down.
Many now famous cases, too numerous to mention here, which bear upon
due process problems, are discussed by the author in tracing in most inter-
esting fashion the development of the use of the due process clause.
However, the conception of "governmental interest" runs through all the
due process and full faith and credit cases. By this test the forum, whether
its own rule is based upon statute or common law, will be required to apply
the foreign statutory rule only when the sister state had such sufficient
governmental interest that the case should be controlled by its statute.
The test of such governmental interest has not been clearly defined, but at
present seems to be synonymous with reasonableness.
In order to afford the reader a better understanding of how the courts
have dealt with various life insurance problems in conflict of laws cases,
Professor Carnahan has taken infinite pains to familiarize the reader with
the constituent parts of the life insurance contract. All of chapter two is
devoted to this subject. His very able analysis, supported by an abundance
of the most recent authorities, is, in itself, a contribution of considerable
merit to legal writings on the life insurance contract. In this chapter he
considers every phase of the contract from the application itself, and vari-
ous provisions found in policies, to supplement riders that are frequently
attached to the policies. Statutory regulations and requirements of the
several states are set forth in such detail as to make this a reference work
of real value to those interested in life insurance law. Here consideration
is also given to fraternal associations, their constitutions and by-laws, and
the certificates issued by them, and the five United States Supreme Court
cases which bear upon the degree of constitutional compulsion affecting
state courts in their choice of laws applicable to fraternal certificates, are
analyzed in detail.
It is recognized, of course, that a majority of the courts employ the rule
of the place of making in determining the validity of contracts in conflict
of laws cases, as opposed to the place of performance, and of the intention
of the parties. However, the factor of the place of making may also be
important in application of the other two rules, and hence its importance
is extended to all three basic choice-of-laws principles governing contracts.
The overwhelming majority of conflict of laws cases which follow the place
of making rule hold that the last act necessary to make a binding contract
of life insurance occurred at the place of physical receipt of the policy by
the applicant. One of the notable exceptions, of course, is found in those
cases in which the premium was paid in advance with the application and
a binding receipt taken. Since different connotations are given by various
courts to the term "delivery," the author devotes chapter three of the book
to a consideration of the delivery concept and its scope. Affecting the de-
livery concept are the manner of payment of premiums, delivery of the
policy by mail, delivery while the applicant is in good health, acceptance of
the policy by the applicant, etc., all of which are dealt with in such fashion
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as to show that the courts adopt one or another connotation of delivery
which will connect the policy with the law of the state where the applicant
resided and manually received the policy. This chapter contains a particu-
larly valuable discussion of the various kinds of "binder receipts" and their
effects. The author shrewdly observes that binding receipts are not used
by the companies for the purpose of governing the choice-of-laws, but for
the purpose of insuring prompt payment of the premium and of placing
the insurance in effect at the earliest possible moment-a result of great
benefit to both the applicant and the insurer.
The development of principles of warranties and representations in in-
surance law-from their introduction for the purpose of protecting under-
writers, through the intermediate stage where, by over-reaching their legiti-
mate object, unjustified advantages were given the insurers, down to the
reaction that set in resulting in a judicial re-examination of the principles
and the enactment of regulatory legislation-is outlined in chapter four.
The statutes in effect in the various states dealing with warranties and rep-
resentations in applications for life insurance are classified according to
seven types, with an eighth division embracing miscellaneous statutes of
ten states having some bearing on the problem.
Problems of representations and warranties have been a fertile field for
litigation. There is a lack of uniformity among current statutes, and in-
consistent rules have been stated by the courts which have frequently made
use of whichever principle would sustain recovery against the insurer. The
author points out, however, that such inconsistency exists only when a
premise is taken that all conflict of laws questions should be decided upon
one single rule, but the inconsistency ceases when it is recognized that courts
employ various rules to solve entirely different problems, and that the
peculiar problems raised by various principles operating in different states
to govern warranties and representations have called for modification of
generally accepted techniques in conflict of laws cases. Application of con-
liet of laws rules in general to problems raised by representations and
warranties is considered and then attention is given to application of the
rules to specific problems such as the requirement that a copy of the appli-
cation be attached to the policy, misstatement of age, health misrepresenta-
tions in the application, the sound health clause, and others. The author
concludes that most courts in misrepresentation cases have explained their
conflict of laws decisions in terms of the rule of the place of making the
contract, the net effect of the decisions being the application of the law
of the insured's residence at the time he applied for the policy, especially
when it is more favorable to him.
The rights of beneficiaries, including questions of insurable interest,
change of beneficiary, assignment of the policy and related matters are
treated in the fifth chapter along with relevant constitutional law factors,
while the succeeding chapter deals with the question of assignment of life
insurance policies and the rights created thereby. It is indicated that the
courts have not consistently followed a single rule in regard to assignment
problems but, on the contrary, have applied all of the available conflict of
19421
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laws rules in such cases. Consequently, in order to prevent a loss of
perspective of the entire field, Professor Carnahan has presented in one
section a r~sum6 of the rules applied by the courts in assignment cases in
addition to his regular closing section setting forth conclusions-a feature
that is repeated near the end of each chapter in the book.
The two chapters headed "Non-Forfeiture Provisions," in addition to
dealing with the rules pertaining to cash surrender values, extended insur-
ance and paid-up insurance are also concerned with such matters as pay-
ment of premiums, necessity of notice by the insurer, policy loans, rein-
statement, abandonment, rescission, surrender and substitution of contracts
-all pertaining to the financial relationship between the insured and the
insurer.
To insure that all phases of the interrelationship between life insurance
law and conflict of laws be covered, Professor Carnahan has included chap-
ters dealing with the manner of the insured's death, such as presumption
of death arising from unexplained absence, death by legal execution, and
suicide of the insured, as well as other factors affecting suit, such as limi-
tation of actions, the incontestability clause and statutory penalties and
attorney's fees imposed upon insurers.
With three choices available under Conflict of Laws principles for selec-
tion of a law governing a contract, it is not surprising that there should
be some apparent inconsistencies. However, as pointed out in the concluding
chapter, it is generally agreed that none of the three should be used to
select the law of a state which does not have some very substantial contact
with the transaction. Unusual attempts by a court to obtain control over
insurance contracts through so-called procedural statutes will receive a
severe check under the rule of the Yates case. While the large number of
decisions adverse to the companies would suggest that a court will apply
whichever of the three possible rules points to a law most favorable to
the insured, this conclusion is not actually borne out by the cases. Analy-
sis which breaks up into smaller categories various phases of the problems
considered, reveals that within the limits of narrow problems, the courts
are in substantial agreement regarding the choice-of-laws rule to be applied.
Furthermore, developments in the last twenty-five years, resulting from a
series of decisions by the United States Supreme Court, show that consti-
tutional limitations have been placed upon the permissible sphere of state
selection of Conflict of Laws rules. As stated by the author, "Emphasis
is being placed by that court upon the definition of governmental interests
which may prohibit or require the application of rules of a particular state
to govern various issues in areas formerly considered strictly within the
realm of state choice-of-laws principles. Judging from recent decisions,
there is reason to believe that this process will be accelerated and that some
of the uncertainties which now exist in conflict of laws will become clarified.
Various clauses of the Constitution are available for this purpose and have
been used. The interstate commerce clause (although not yet used in in-
surance cases), the obligation of contracts clause, and the privileges and
immunities clause may be mentioned as potential sources of review, and
some of them have frequently constituted the bases of decisions."
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Professor Carnahan has demonstrated a familiarity with life insurance
problems not ordinarily found in one not connected with a life insurance
company. In each subdivision of the book he has examined the cases in-
volving these problems in the light of principles underlying Conflict of Laws.
While the unrelated array of cases seem to announce a mass of inconsistent
rules and principles, nevertheless the approach used by Professor Carnahan
-of directing attention to the treatment of one phase of one section of the
whole field of conflict of laws-shows that within these narrow limits sub-
stantial agreement among the courts may be found.
The complexities of the subject itself are such that at best it is difficult
to keep clearly in mind what one is reading. Professor Carnahan has, how-
ever, rendered great assistance to the reader by pausing at convenient inter-
vals to recapitulate in various subdivisions which are found near the close
of each chapter.
The policies and contracts of more than a hundred life insurance com-
panies were studied and analyzed by Professor Carnahan in connection
with this book. Since the terminology he uses is that of the business itself,
the volume should be greatly appreciated by those in the life insurance
business. It is copiously annotated and contains a vast store of references
to other books, and to cases, statutes jand law review articles. This work
should be of great value to lawyers and should be a welcome addition to the
libraries of all those who are concerned with Conflict of Laws and related
problems arising in connection with the life insurance business.
MAuRiCB E. BNS0N.t
THE DUAL STATE. A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF DICTATORSHIP. By
Ernst Fraenkel. Translated from the German by E. A. Shils, in collabora-
tion with Edith Lowenstein and Klaus Knorr. Oxford University Press,
New York. Pp. xvi, 208, with appendix and notes. $3.00.
The author has made a most valuable contribution to the legal and politi-
cal analysis of the Third Reich. The book covers the period from 1933 to
1988, when the author was still practicing law as an attorney at the Berlin
Court of Appeals, and presents an excellent study of first-hand legal mate-
rial for this period. However, since the material is limited to the first five
years of National Socialism, the conclusions reached by the author are
necessarily limited, so far as their present-day validity is concerned.
Within a system commonly considered the highest development of central-
ized government, the author distinguishes two "states" or rather spheres
of government, the Normative and Prerogative States. The former is de-
fined as "an administrative body endowed with elaborate powers for safe-
guarding the legal order as expressed in statutes, decisions of the courts,
and activities of the administrative agencies." The Prerogative State is
"that governmental system which exercises unlimited arbitrariness and vio-
lence unchecked by any legal guarantees." (P. xiii.) Both exist simul-
t LL.B., Washington University, 1927. Assistant Counsel, American Life
Convention, Chicago, Illinois.
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